Problems laying at the foundation of cognitive sciences, such as the mind-body problem, the existence of qualia or the symbol grounding problem are all due to the lack of proper language to describe mind events. Such language is introduced in this paper. Cognitive systems are viewed primarily from the mentalistic point of view. Concepts and symbols interact strongly forming ``mind objects". Mind states are identified with activations of these objects. An abstract, multidimensional ``mind space" is defined, with the axes (dimensions) of the coordinate system corresponding to features of internal representations, such as preprocessed sensory data and abstract qualities. This space serves as a theater for mental events. A neural network, or a brain, is a natural realization for such model of the mind. Activation of objects of the mind space is governed by psychophysical laws and brings casual changes in the neural hardware. From the neuropsychological point of view mind objects result from activity of the neural cell assemblies. No fundamental problems with understanding of the real minds arise and the way to computational models of artificial minds is clear. The problem of free will and consciousness is also discussed.
KEYWORDS: cell assemblies, cognitive philosophy, cognitive science, consciousness, inner space, mental representation, mind, mind evolution, mind-body problem, philosophy of mind, psychophysics, symbol grounding.
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