Submitted to Journal of Consciousness Studies (January 1999)
Abstract: Fantastic ideas about the mind in general and consciousness in particular abound. Many philosophical efforts are devoted to solutions of non–existing problems. In this paper errors in recent discussions and thought experiments in the philosophy of mind are pointed out. Identical functions imply identical physical construction, therefore one cannot change the brain without changing the mind. Small changes in physical architecture lead to differences in functions. Once these facts are acknowledged hard problem of phenomenal experience becomes a question of finding an approximation to brain-like computing that converges to mind-like behavior. Phenomenal experience arises due to the non-verbal discrimination in the brain-like computing systems and has no special status. Claims of qualia are necessary consequence of brain-like organization of computations, in particular the ability to comment upon physical states of the architecture carrying out these computations. Minimal require-ments for an artificial system that should be able to claim qualia are given.
Paper in PDF format, 122 KB
Projects on similar subject and BACK to the on-line publications of W. Duch.